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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
CLINTON MARCUS CRANE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43992
LATAH COUNTY NO. CR 2015-2925
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Clinton Marcus Crane pled guilty to felony driving under the influence, the
district court sentenced him to eight years, with two years fixed. Mr. Crane moved
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction in his sentence, which the
district court denied. Mr. Crane appeals to this Court, asserting that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35
motion.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the presentence report (“PSI”), Mr. Crane tipped over and crashed a
loaded log truck going around a corner on Highway 99. (PSI,1 pp.2–3; Idaho State
Police Report, p.3.) Mr. Crane’s employer owned the truck. (PSI, pp.11–12; R., p.12.)
The police administered a breath test to Mr. Crane with a result of .232/.221 blood
alcohol concentration. (PSI, p.3.)
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Crane committed the crime of
driving under the influence of alcohol, a felony due to a prior felony driving under the
influence conviction. (R., pp.9–10.) Mr. Crane waived a preliminary hearing, and the
magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.36–37, 40.) The State filed an
Information charging Mr. Crane with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.41–42.)
Mr. Crane pled guilty as charged. (R., pp.48–49; Tr. Vol. I,2 p.6, L.15–p.8, L.4, p.18,
L.17–p.19, L.4.) The district court sentenced him to eight years, with two years fixed.
(R., pp.51–53; Tr. Vol. II, p.29, L.25–p.30, L.3.) Mr. Crane filed a timely Notice of Appeal
from the district court’s Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.55–58, 60–61.)
Mr. Crane filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 for a six-month reduction in the
fixed portion of his sentence, but a six-month increase in the determinate portion of his
sentence, so his total sentence would remain eight years. (R., pp.73–74, 76–77
(amended Rule 35 motion).) The district court denied his motion. (Aug. R., pp.1–4.)

Citations to the PSI and other confidential exhibits refer to the document and its
internal pagination.
2 There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry
of plea hearing. The second, cited at Volume II, contains day one of the sentencing
hearing. The third transcript contains day two of the sentencing hearing, but it is not
cited herein.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
eight years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Crane, following his guilty plea to
felony driving under the influence?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Crane’s Rule 35
motion?
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Crane, Following His Guilty Plea To Felony
Driving Under The Influence
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Crane’s sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-8005(6). Accordingly, to show
that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Crane “must show that the sentence,
in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.”
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
Mr. Crane asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends
that the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in
light of the mitigating factors, including his issues with alcohol abuse and positive
employment history.
Mr. Crane’s struggle with alcohol abuse, the impact of his alcoholism on his
behavior, and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court
should give “proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for
treating the problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance
abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of
punishment upon sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here,
forty-two year old Mr. Crane began drinking alcohol when he was eight years old. (PSI,
p.13.) Mr. Crane has had success with treatment programs and significant periods of
sobriety. (PSI, pp.13–14; Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.14–18.) Prior to his arrest for the instant
offense, Mr. Crane relapsed and was drinking “as much as a 1/5 of whiskey every
night.” (PSI, p.14.) He recognized that his alcohol abuse contributed to his criminal
behavior. (PSI, p.14.) The instant offense was the product of his alcohol addiction, not
any inherent criminal thinking. See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (lack of
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criminal intent as a mitigating factor). Further, Mr. Crane accepted responsibility for his
behavior. (PSI, p.3.) He also stated that he was “ready to quit.” (PSI, p.14.) In light of
Mr. Crane’s life-long issues with alcohol abuse, the district court abused its discretion by
failing to give adequate consideration to this mitigating factor at sentencing.
Moreover, Mr. Crane’s positive work history and future employment options
support a lesser sentence. See id. (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating
factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (Ct. App. 1982) (employment
and desire to advance within company were mitigating circumstances). Mr. Crane has
maintained steady employment and has positive references from his past employers.
(PSI, pp.11–12.) He has experience in agricultural, mechanical, and electrical work.
(PSI, pp.9. 12.) His most recent employment was in farming and logging. (PSI, pp.11–
12.) Despite the truck accident, this employer told the presentence investigator that he
would rehire Mr. Crane. (PSI, p.12.) The employer stated that Mr. Crane was “easy to
get along with,” “always on time or early,” and “very knowledgeable.” (PSI, p.12.) In
addition, Mr. Crane’s step-brother testified at Mr. Crane’s sentencing hearing that, if
placed on probation, Mr. Crane could live with him and his family and work for their
family business. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, L.1–p.12, L.21.) His step-brother said that he would
make sure Mr. Crane did not drink alcohol on probation and would contact his probation
officer if he did. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, Ls.7–12.) Mr. Crane’s employability is another strong
mitigating factor that the district court failed to give adequate weight to at sentencing.
Based on the mitigating circumstances, including Mr. Crane’s employability and
issues with alcohol abuse, the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Crane’s Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903
(Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must
“consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the
reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent
review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276
(Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence
under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule
35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Here, Mr. Crane requested that the district court reduce the fixed portion of his
sentence by six months, but increase the indeterminate portion of his sentence by six
months. (R., pp.76–77.) Specifically, Mr. Crane “anticipate[d] being released on parole
at the end of the fixed portion of his sentence” in October of 2017. (R., p.77.) But
Mr. Crane felt “confident that he can readily obtain employment if he were to be paroled
in April rather than October” because of his primary work experience in agriculture.
(R., p.77; see also PSI, pp.9, 11–12.) Thus, Mr. Crane requested the six-month
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reduction “to assure his ability to comply with the parole requirement of obtaining and
maintaining employment.” (R., p.77.) This additional information warranted Mr. Crane’s
requested modification of his sentence. It shows that he was motivated to maintain his
sobriety, obtain employment, and otherwise comply with the terms of his probation. The
district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Crane respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate or remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, Mr. Crane
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying his Rule
35 motion and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2016.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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